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development (Pandey et al., 2009; Fuji-
sawa et al., 1999; Jaffe´ et al., 2012). An
important question arising from this study
is how COLD1 (and its plant homologs)
may contribute to cold tolerance. Here,
the topology of COLD1 suggests that it
may function as an ion-conducting pro-
tein. The authors observe the localization
of COLD1 in the endoplasmic reticulum
and the plasma membrane. Interestingly,
a recent study characterized a similar
mammalian protein as being resident in
the Golgi and functioning as a cellular
Golgi pH regulator in Chinese hamster
(Cricetulus griseus). This protein was
found to be involved in Golgi acidification
and functioning as a voltage-dependent
anion channel (Maeda et al., 2008).
Remarkably, Ma et al. reported an
elevated basal Ca2+ concentration in
rice plants expressing the cold-tolerant
COLD1 allele. Moreover, they observed
temperature-dependent changes in the
protein structure of COLD1. These find-
ings make it tempting to speculate that
COLD1 might convey a specific physical
parameter represented by temperature
into changes in cellular Ca2+ concentra-
tions. This Ca2+ signal would then trigger
plant adaptation to the environmental
cue accordingly (Figure 1).
The study by Ma et al. also provides
evidence that COLD1 interacts with the1046 Cell 160, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevierice G protein a subunit 1 (RGA1), sug-
gesting that COLD1 might be involved
in G-protein-dependent signal transduc-
tion. Importantly, they also demonstrated
that COLD1jap from the cold-tolerant
japonica cultivar, but not the allele from
the cold-sensitive indica cultivar, acceler-
ated the RGA1 GTPase activity. Similarly,
truncated protein COLD1Djap did not
infer cold tolerance. In line with the po-
tential contribution of COLD1jap to Ca2+
signaling, voltage-clamp recording in
Xenopus oocytes revealed that COLD1
affected the influx of cations such as
Ca2+ in the presence of RGA1. This obser-
vation suggests that the cold-stimulated
inward current may originate from Ca2+-
dependent interaction between them.
These findings raise interesting ques-
tions considering the cross kingdom
conservation of COLD1. It will be most
interesting to address whether this pro-
tein may function as a temperature-regu-
lated ion channel by analyzing COLD1
currents in reconstituted lipid bilayers.
In addition, how do different alleles
of COLD1 influence cytoplasmic Ca2+
concentrations? From this perspective,
further elucidating the subcellular locali-
zation of COLD1 would be important
for providing insights into its role in regu-
lating cellular ion homeostasis. Another
intriguing question is whether the elevatedr Inc.Ca2+ concentration in COLD1jap plants
directly triggers enhanced cold tolerance.
Would this mean that increasing resting
Ca2+ levels andcold-inducedCa2+ release
could be sufficient to cope with cold envi-
ronment? Overall, this work may pave the
way to tackle the food production insuffi-
ciency due to environmental changes
and may contribute to food security by
stabilizing the yield of a major crop that
nurtures a large human population on
this planet.REFERENCES
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Haroush and Williams trained pairs of monkeys to play in a prisoner’s dilemma game, a model of
social interactions. Recording from the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), they find neurons
whose activity reflects the anticipation of the opponent’s yet unknown choice, whichmay be impor-
tant in guiding animals’ performance in the game.Imagine that you are playing the following
game against a stranger. Each of you
has to choose the option C or D without
knowing which option your opponent will
choose. Your outcome will depend bothonyourowndecision andyouropponents,
as outlinedona table (or a ‘‘payoffmatrix’’;
Figure 1A). If both of you choose C, you
both get $4. If both choose D, both get
$2. However, if one chooses C andthe other D, the former gets the biggest
reward ($6) while the latter gets the small-
est ($1). Which option would you choose?
Here is one way to think. Assuming that
your opponent chooses C, you get $4
Figure 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
(A) An example payoff matrix of a game. There are two players (A and B), and each has to choose one of two options (C and D). Each makes a choice without
knowing what the opponent will do. Depending on one’s own and the other’s choices, each receives an outcome defined by the payoff matrix (e.g., the number
indicates dollar amount that each receives).
(B) The original prisoner’s dilemma game. Each prisoner is asked to either defect the other by testifying that the other committed the crime or cooperate with the
other by being silent.
(C) A payoff matrix in a general form. T > R > P > S and 2R > T+S define a prisoner’s dilemma. The latter criterion guarantees that the players cannot escape the
dilemma simply by taking turns.
(D) Two monkeys played an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (defined by A in Haroush and Williams [2015]).if you choose C and $6 if you choose
D. So you should choose D. Assuming
that the opponent chooses D, you get $1
if you choose C and $2 if you choose
D. So you should choose D again. The
answer is simple! No matter what the
opponent will do, you are always better
off choosing D.
A closer look might make you unhappy
though. Choosing D actually results in
the worst outcome in terms of the total
gain (2+2 < 1+6 < 4+4). Moreover, both
players choosing C ($4) is better than
both players choosing D ($2). Why not
both choose C? Well, if your opponent
knows that you will choose C, he or she
might betray or defect you (i.e., choose
D) to get a larger reward! ‘‘Cooperation’’
is needed for the common good.
This type of game is called a prisoner’s
dilemma (PD), which was named after the
famous example of prisoners negotiating
with attorneys (Figure 1B) (Camerer,
2003). To be a PD game, the payoff matrix
has to fulfill specific criteria (Figure 1C).
It is the mathematical structure of the
payoff matrix that generates the sense
of cooperation and defection. In other
words, one need not be told that C is
cooperation and D is defection.
Game theory studies what happens
when people—or genes or nations—
interact (Camerer, 2003; Morgenstern
and Von Neumann, 1953). It provides the
strategy that a self-interested ‘‘rational’’
agent must follow in such situations. In
the case of the game described above,
game theory predicts that both players
will choose D (mutual defect) since thereis no incentive for each player to move
away from it (that is, mutual defection is
the only ‘‘Nash equilibrium’’ in the PD
game). Contrary to this reasoning, when
humans play the PD game, about half of
the players cooperate (Camerer, 2003).
When the games are repeated with the
same stranger (iterated PD), cooperation
starts high and then decreases over time
(Camerer, 2003; Rilling et al., 2002).
When non-human animals play PD
games, fewer but some cooperative be-
haviors have been observed (Stevens
and Hauser, 2004). The PD game has
been regarded as the E.coli of social
psychology (Axelrod, 1997): it mimics
many real-world dilemmas and is thought
to be a good model to study the emer-
gence and development of cooperative
behavior. Yet, very little is known about
the neural underpinnings of PD games
(Behrens et al., 2009; Fehr and Camerer,
2007; Rilling et al., 2002). To address
this question at a single-neuron level, in
this issue of Cell, Haroush and Williams
(2015) trained monkeys, not humans, to
play in an iterated PD game (Figure 1D)
(Haroush and Williams, 2015).
In their study, the monkeys sit side
by side and make decisions sequentially
to obtain different amounts of juice
instead of money. They cannot see
the other’s choice until both have made
their selections. Contrary to the game
theoretic prediction, the monkeys choose
C (‘‘cooperation’’) in 34.7% of trials.
Note that choosing C does not neces-
sarily mean that the monkeys understand
the concept of ‘‘cooperation’’ or evenCell 160aim for mutual benefits; in this task, it is
hard to know whether the monkeys
know the amount of juice the opponent
got. Note also that the monkeys have to
learn the payoff matrix by playing (that
is, no explicit explanation of the payoff
matrix could be given). Nevertheless, the
monkeys choose Cmore often if the other
chooses C in the preceding trial and less
so if the other chooses D, similar to how
humans perform in this game. Further-
more, when a monkey plays either with
a computer or with a monkey partner in
a separate room, the overall probability
of choosing C greatly decreases, sug-
gesting that social contexts affect their
choices. Lastly, to probe whether the
monkeys have good understanding of
the payoff matrix, in some trials, the
monkey is informed of the opponent’s
choice before it makes a decision. In
these trials, the monkey chooses D more
than 90% of the time when the opponent
had already chosen D.
The authors then recorded the activity
of single neurons in the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC). The ACC is
subdivided into the dorsal and ventral
parts (dACC and vACC, respectively);
dACC is thought to be involved in
reward-guided decisions and processing
cognitive conflicts, whereas vACC is
involved in social emotions and social
interests (Behrens et al., 2009; Rilling
et al., 2002; Rudebeck et al., 2006;
Somerville et al., 2006). They find two
non-overlapping neuronal populations
whose activity co-fluctuates with either
the monkey’s own choice or the, March 12, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1047
opponents’ yet-unknown choice. Specif-
ically, 27.6% of the recorded neurons
encode the opponent’s choice (versus
11.4% for self-choice) during the post-se-
lection period and 7% (versus 15.7% for
self-choice) during the pre-selection
period. Note that both of these periods
are before the opponent’s decision is re-
vealed to the monkey, suggesting that
these activities are related to prediction
or anticipation of the opponent’s choice.
Based on the activity of a population of
other-predicting neurons, it is possible
to ‘‘decode’’ the opponent’s choice
with high precision (79.4%). Importantly,
the number of other-predicting neurons
decreases when two monkeys play in
separate rooms.
Further analyses help to exclude the
possibility that other-predicting neurons
are encoding other task features. For
example, based on the payoff matrix, the
monkey receives an overall larger reward
(four or six drops of juice) when the oppo-
nent chooses C compared to when the
opponent chooses D (one or two drops).
Could these ‘‘other-predicting’’ neurons
in fact encode expected self-reward?
Their results suggest that this is not the
case.1048 Cell 160, March 12, 2015 ª2015 ElsevieThey further show that disrupting the
dACC activity by applying a strong elec-
trical current during the pre-selection
period decreases the odds of choosing
C. This effect is most prominent in
trials when the opponent chose C in the
previous trial. It is unclear, however,
whether this behavioral effect is due to
the alteration of other-predicting neurons;
most other-predicting neurons are active
after rather than before selection. Instead,
other-predicting neurons may contribute
to learning for future trials. Further efforts
are required to elucidate how other-
predicting neurons contribute to choices
and what aspects of social interactions
or prior experience drive their activity.
Furthermore, how electrical stimulation
of the dACC, whichmay perturb the activ-
ity of other interconnected areas, leads
to less ‘‘cooperative’’ choices remains
to be further investigated. Finally, what
really makes the difference between two
monkeys sitting side by side versus play-
ing in separate rooms? This last question
may provide insights into what defines
‘‘social.’’
Haroush and Williams (2015) provide
a powerful experimental system to
study the neural mechanisms underlyingr Inc.social decision making. The abilities to
record single-neuron activities and to
manipulate their activities offer unprece-
dented opportunities to unravel intricate
brain processes underlying aspects of
social interactions.
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